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Introduction
The founding fathers of academic primary care con-
ducted research using routinely collected practice data.
William Pickles’ description of infectious disease, Frans
Huygen’s Families with their Illness, and John Fry’s
CommonMorbidity’ were produced in an era of paper
data collection and provide examples of general prac-
tice research that changed the face of medicine.1
The development primary care informatics as disci-
plines has largely come from the development of general
practice computer systems which provide access to
routinely collected data.2
Patient data has always been used by health services
and researchers for some purposes without consent.
However, the boundaries for access and use are not
clearly deﬁned and this is an issue for the public, health
services and researchers. The lack of clear limits to
access and use of data within the health service may
have contributed to the creation of ‘The BigOpt out’, a
campaign to help people opt out of having summary
health data about them shared across the NHS com-
puter system.3 Notwithstanding the reluctance of some
people to share data across the NHS, a recent survey
suggests that a majority of people are happy for their
personal health data to be used in research.4
In the UK, further consultations about how to use
routinely collected data are currently underway. Con-
necting forHealth has just closed a consultation on the
use of routinely collected data. This consultation is
due to report in February.5 Also, the Wellcome Trust
has recently published a consensus statement which
sets out to deﬁne appropriate boundaries for re-
searchers using primary care data. The report provides
an excellent statement of principles for researchers;
though perhaps inevitably does not deﬁne or address
some of the informatics principles which will be needed
to underpin its implementation.6,7
This edition of the journal contains three papers
which collectively describe and deﬁne our current
dilemmas and suggest way that we might remedy the
current situation.
Solution 1: Customised calculation of
the risk of breaching privacy
Navarro argues that we must move from a situation
where we assume that all data and risks of privacy
breaches are equal to one where we assess the risk
breach according to individual circumstances.8 He
tells us that fundamentally two things aﬀect the risk
of a breach of privacy: the nature of the data – essentially
its granularity; and howmuch we can trust the person
who has access to it.
The nature of the data
Some data are so non-speciﬁc that minimal security is
needed; while others are much more vulnerable. He
sees ‘Inference attack’ – where information security is
breached by piecing together pieces of information
available at a low security level – as the main risk to
personal privacy. This problemhas beenwidely reported
and accepted within bioinformatics for some time, yet
this learning has not been assimilated into the wider
informatics or research communities.9,10 For example, in
the recent Connecting for Health public consultation a
ﬁctitious anonymised medical record is created for
‘Pam’ (Figure 1). This record gives the precise dates of
six items of medical history and one operation. Amajor
diagnosis is labelled by year of onset, and another
surgical procedure by year. Precise height and weight
are given, along with smoking habit, ﬁrst part of
postcode, county and town. A public ﬁgure might
have one or more of these pieces of information in
the public domain and knowledge of these (e.g. from
local press reports)may provide access to others which
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that individual might not wish to disclose. In this
ﬁctitious case Pam may have not have disclosed her
depression. It is hard to see why somany precise pieces
of contextual information are needed?
Trust
Trust is hard to measure. However, the importance of
trust resonates with many of us who work in primary
care.11 It is self-evident that some individuals and
groups or organisations are clearly more trustworthy
than others; and this same principle apply in infor-
mation security. There maybe less risk of a privacy
breach from sharing real records with a senior re-
searcher than from allowing a technician to download
a complete data base using an ‘approved’ process.
Emerging professionalism in informatics should help
engender greater trust.12 The creation of a UKCouncil
for Health Informatics Professionals (UK CHIP) and
of improved career pathways in the Swindell’s report
represents progress.13,14
In summary, Navarro would have us move from a
policy of blankedmeasure to one inwhichwe calculate
‘privacy breach risk’. Risk assessments carried out as
part of normal health and safety processes look at risk
as a simple formula:
Risk = Hazard (the danger)  Likelihood
(the chance of it happening)
Navarro sees:
Privacy risk breach = Granularity (Nature) of
the data  The Trustworthiness of the Individual.
Solution 2: An ethically sustainable
integrated approach to privacy using
health cards
Neame, in the second paper in this edition paints a
rather diﬀerent picture.15 He speaks from the experi-
ence of someone who has worked extensively imple-
menting healthcare IT information security in New
Zealand. The paper is in two parts: (1) the legal frame-
work and principles; (2) using health cards.
Legal framework
Theﬁrst part of his paper deals with the European legal
framework which deﬁnes privacy and the potential legal
risks if it is breached. Neame explains that research and
audit are secondary uses of data and therefore if data
are identiﬁed they require the informed consent of the
patient.Where de-identiﬁcation has occurred in a way
that re-identiﬁcation is impossible then consent is not
required. Neame lists four principles which need to be
met:
. patients should have control of access to their data
. only de-identiﬁed data are needed for most second-
ary purposes
. where data are needed: seek consent and make
minimal disclosure
. consent and permission should be simple for patients
and professionals.
He also explains how the context and content of the
record can be separated and that most of the risks
Figure 1 Connecting for Health Consultation – example of an anonymised record. Reproduced from the NHS
Connecting for Health website (www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk) with permission.
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associatedwith context are already known. Among the
contextual items he feels it is essential to remove some
which are included in the example anonymised record
for Pam Smith (Figure 1):
. biometric identiﬁers (possibly including Pam’s exact
height and weight)
. all dates (there are seven precise dates recorded on
Pam’s example anonymised record and three items
listed by year)
. geographical indicators which embrace less than
20 000 people (we don’t know the size of Pam’s town).
This policy would systematically remove many of the
risks identiﬁed by Navarro; though both papers identify
the same typesofdatabeingvulnerable to inferenceattack.
Using health cards
The health card is presented as the logical way of
providing patients with control. Patients can even be
allowed more than one ‘identity’ if they wish to keep
certain items conﬁdential from one provider.
In summary, using identiﬁable data for secondary
purposes without consent is highly risky and likely to
be illegal. Clear principles give patients much greater
control of access to their records and separate context
from context and remove much of the context which
lend records vulnerable to inference attack.
Consensus statement on using
routinely collected data for
research
The ﬁnal paper dealing with privacy issues is a work-
shop report fromtheUK’s Society forAcademicPrimary
Care (SAPC) annual scientiﬁc meeting.16 Routinely
collected primary care data have been described as
‘Goldmines for research’,17 yet many of us involved in
research ﬁnd it time consuming to get through the
approval process.
This paper juxtaposes a summary of the Wellcome
consensus report described in the introduction and
the outputs of a workshop held at the conference. It
contains practical suggestions for using technology,
and developing the right contractual framework with
practices. Its recommendations include the import-
ance of keeping the GP as the (trusted) advocate for
their patients’ advocate.
Summary
We are all committed to keeping health data private;
andwhilstNavarro andNeamehave completely diﬀerent
models their very diﬀerent approaches both seek to
mitigate the same risks. Both authors make a valuable
contribution to this current debate. Navarro suggest
we shouldmeasure ‘privacy risk breach’ and to present
a simple theoretical framework for its assessment
(privacy risk breech = nature of the data  trust).
Neameurges us to think carefully and separately about
the context and content of data and to adopt strict
rules for sharing context. He also presents a much
more patient-centred framework for sharing health
data, and health card controlled data access.
Hinds presents a model whereby researchers can
continue to utilise these data goldmines – something
the public currently support. However, this is not
support we should take for granted and active engage-
ment of the public in this research and the past and
current consultations are to be welcomed in this
context.
Emerging professionalism in informatics should
help develop better deﬁnitions and core generaliseable
theory about risks to patients’ privacy about how to
mitigate them; but more importantly informaticians
who canbe trusted. Further research is needed to explore
how to measure the risks and consequences of privacy
breach. However, if sharing of health data is blocked
then patients may continue to suﬀer because infor-
mation known about them in one part of the health
system is not made available in another; and research
which might improve patient care will not be done.
Informatics groups should not allow themselves the
luxury of adopting anunconstructive critical approach –
but instead should either support current consensus
statements or come up with speciﬁc proposals of how
these might be improved.
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